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I. INTRODUCTION
Everett Perry was fired for following the law. For five years,
Perry worked for the Michigan Department of Corrections, known
commonly as the MDOC, as a disciplinary hearing officer.' In
essence, his duties entailed presiding over, and disposing of, major
misconduct disciplinary hearings at a Michigan state prison.2
Although the MDOC maintained an unwritten policy of limiting not
guilty findings to ten percent of total dispositions, Perry routinely
found approximately eighteen percent of the defendants before him
not guilty.3 He ignored the unwritten guilty verdict quota and instead
decided cases based on the strength of prison regulations as they
applied to the facts of those cases. In doing so, he upheld the inmates'
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in the face of a policy
which, as will be explored below, robbed inmates of those rights.
After disciplining Perry repeatedly, the MDOC fired him, insisting
that he was a sub-par hearings officer.4
Perry sued the MDOC on numerous grounds,5 but he failed to
bring the most important claim available to him-a third party due
process claim. Such claims are ideal for protecting the rights of those
* Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, DC. J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1999; M.P.P., Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, 1999; A.B., Brown University, 1995. 1 am grateful to my family
for unconditional support over the years and to The Honorable Damon J. Keith
for his enduring mentorship, tutelage, and friendship. I also wish to thank
Christine Desan'and Christopher Edley for inspiration and encouragement
during law school and beyond. Finally, I wish to thank Mellissa Campbell,
Shavar Jeffries, Carter Snead, and Nathan Brown for their comments.
See Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2000).
2 See id.
3 See id. at 605.
4 See id.
5 See id.at 600. Perry filed a racial discrimination claim as well as a First
Amendment freedom of expression claim in federal court against MDOC
prison officials. In making the freedom of expression claim, Perry presented
the court with facts revealing the MDOC's guilty verdict quota.
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who cannot protect their own rights, and Perry's case consequently
presents an ideal factual scenario for such a claim. There is no reason
to believe that inmates in other prisons do not face similar injustices
within their prisons' disciplinary schemes, but there is no way to
gauge how pervasive such injustice may be. The informal and
unwritten MDOC policy came to light only because a hearing officer
refused to abide by it, was fired, and brought a claim exposing the
relevant facts. In the absence of this confluence of events, the MDOC
guilty verdict quota might remain known only to those charged with
its enforcement.
This article will argue that third party standing to assert
disciplinary hearing defendants' due process claims should be
available to prison disciplinary hearing officers, such as Perry, who
are terminated for disregarding disciplinary hearing guilty verdict
quotas. Part Il will examine the history of our nation's prison system,
as well as the history of judicial reforms which have paved the way
for third party due process claims on behalf of inmates subjected to
prison disciplinary hearings. Part III will discuss the requirements for
successful third party standing. Part IV will present Perry's case.
Finally, Part V will apply the requirements for successful third party
standing to the facts of Perry's case.
Ultimately, this article will assert that a third party challenge
to intra-prison policies establishing guilty verdict quotas for prison
disciplinary hearings provides an avenue for guaranteeing the
preservation of prisoners' due process rights.
I. REFORM IN AMERICA'S PRISONS: A BRIEF
HISTORY
The history of our nation's prisons is long and tortured.
Today, prisons serve to punish.6 It was not, however, always that
6 See Richard D. Nobleman, Wilson v. Seiter: Prison Conditions and the Eighth
Amendment Standard, 24 PAC. L.J. 275, 278 (1992).
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way. Through most of the eighteenth century, authorities meted
punishment out in the form of torture and public humiliation.7
Criminals were branded, whipped, or subjected to the stocks or the
pillory depending on the offense committed.8 Only minor offenders,
vagrants, and the accused awaiting punishment served time in prison-
like institutions called workhouses.9 In the late eighteenth century,
however, society sought a more humane method of dealing with
criminals, and the penitentiary was born.'0 The rehabilitative ideal
was key to the new system of imprisonment. Indeed, the goal of the
penitentiary was to make the criminal feel penitent." Early prison
theorists believed that in the absence of deleterious influences, a
criminal could be reformed into a productive member of society
through hard work, religious study, and introspection.' Optimism,
however, crumbled as penitentiaries grew overcrowded and
exceedingly unpleasant and served to obstruct rather than facilitate an
inmate's reintroduction to free society."
Shortly after the Civil War, the rehabilitative ideal once again
gained steam. Authorities exposed prisoners to educational and
vocational opportunities, grouped them on the basis of personal
progress, and offered them the possibility of parole if they
improved. 4 Despite the continued existence of overcrowding and
oppression in the nation's prisons, the idea that incarceration should
serve to rehabilitate offenders persisted well into the twentieth
century. 5 Ultimately, however, in the midst of widespread beliefthat
rehabilitative efforts were unsuccessful, a retributive theory of
7 See id.
s See Matthew W. Meskell, The History of Prisons in the United States from
1777 to 1877, 51 STAN L. REV. 839, 841-42 (1999).
9 See Nobleman, supra note 6, at 277.
'o See id. at 278.
"1 See id.
12 See id.
'" See id.
14 See id.
15 See Nobleman at 279.
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incarceration emerged and the contemporary idea that prisons exist to
punish took hold. 6 Resources for rehabilitation decreased, prison
populations increased, 7 and whatever humanity managed to survive
in the prison environment began to dissolve.
For much of the twentieth century-even when inmate
rehabilitation remained the primary theoretical goal of incarcera-
tion--courts avoided adjudicating cases initiated by prisoners
regarding prison administration, citing as reasons, lack ofjurisdiction,
lack of topic-specific expertise, reluctance to undermine prison
discipline, and fear of being inundated with prisoner petitions."
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, the courts,
finding that prison administrators were failing to protect disciplinary
hearing defendants' constitutional rights, increased their involvement
in prisoner cases.' Years earlier, in Price v. Johnston,2 ° the Supreme
Court established that the very nature of imprisonment demands that
some constitutional rights are lost to the imprisoned.2 Other
constitutional rights are, of course, preserved. Price, however, did not
distinguish the "lost" rights from the "preserved" rights. As such,
once the courts delved into intra-prison disputes with constitutional
implications, the Supreme Court was faced with the task of outlining
the parameters of an inmate's constitutional rights. The Court did so
case by case, determining, for example, that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee inmates significant religious freedoms,22 that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause protects
16 See id.
17 See id.
11 See id.at 280.
19 See id. at 281-82.
20 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
21 See id. at 285.
22 See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
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inmates from invidious racial discrimination,23 and that inmates are
guaranteed access to the courts.24
The Court also determined that some, but not all, protections
of the Due Process Clause apply to inmates. In Wolffv. McDonnell,25
the Court drew a firm distinction between due process in the criminal
prosecution context and due process in the inmate disciplinary
hearing context.26 In that case, the Court was called upon to determine
the amount of process to which an inmate is entitled prior to being
stripped of good-time credits27 for a disciplinary violation. As a
threshold matter, the Court found the inmates had a valid liberty
interest in the good-time credits.28 The Court, therefore, proceeded in
its due process analysis.
23 See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
24 See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,485 (1969).
25 418 U.S.539 (1974).
26 See id at 556. ("Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings
does not apply.")
27 Good time credits are, in essence, rewards for prisoners who have exhibited
good behavior while serving their sentences. Under statute, Nebraska state
prisoners who accrued such credits were entitled to reduction of sentence. See
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83--1,107 (1972) ("(1) The chief executive officers of a
facility shall reduce, for parole purposes, for good behavior and faithful
performance of duties while confined in a facility the term of a committed
offender as follows: Two months on the first year, two months on the second
year, three months on the third year, four months for each succeeding year of
his term and pro rata for any part thereof which is less than a year. In addition,
for especially meritorious behavior or exceptional performance of his duties,
an offender may receive a further reduction, for parole purposes, not to exceed
five days, for any month of imprisonment.")
28 "It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for
satisfactory behavior while in prison... But the state having created the right
to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized
for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is
sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to
those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required
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Respondents, inmates at a Nebraska prison, argued they were
not afforded the procedural protections to which they were entitled
under the Due Process Clause prior to losing the credits.29 Petitioners
countered that extensive procedure prior to loss of credits was
unnecessary because disciplining inmates was a policy issue, not a
constitutional issue.3°
The Court determined that the Petitioners' position was
"plainly untenable,"'" noting that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,"3 and citing
other constitutional rights to which inmates may avail themselves.
Still, the Court was unwilling to provide the inmates what they
sought-procedural protections tantamount to those provided for
parolees.33 Under the Court's prior decision in Morrissey v. Brewer,34
parolees enjoy the protection of numerous procedures prior to
suffering parole revocation.35 Asserting that parole revocation is a
more profound loss than the deprivation of good time credits, the
Court chose to scrutinize the process guaranteed parolees under
Morrissey and parse those procedural rights appropriate for the
by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily
abrogated." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.
'9 See id. at 553.
30 See id. at 555.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 555-56.
11 See id. at 560.
14 408 U.S.471 (1972).
I ld. at 489 (holding that prior to revoking parole the following procedures must
be exhausted: "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) dis-
closure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and
detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact-
finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole").
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inmates in the case before it from those appropriate primarily in the
parole revocation context.36
In doing so, the Court left several traditional due process
protections-the ability to present documentary evidence, the right to
call witnesses, and the rights to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion-to the discretion of prison officials." The Court was reluctant
to establish these protections as universally applicable rules, insisting
that different circumstances merit different degrees of process.38 "The
better course at this time," the court insisted, "in a period where
prison practices are diverse and somewhat experimental, is to leave
these matters to the sound discretion of the officials of state
prisons."39
The Court held, however, that other bedrock protections were
mandatory. Specifically, the Court decided the inmates in question
were entitled to a hearing and to written notice of charges against
them to be presented at least twenty-four hours prior to their
scheduled hearings.4" The Court further held that, following the
hearing, inmates were entitled to a written statement detailing the
reasons supporting any disciplinary action.4' Although the Court did
not prescribe the parameters of the mandated hearing, it established
the hearing must be meaningful and fair, noting that "[t]he touchstone
36 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-71.
3 See id. at 566-69. The Court suggested that if the procedures were not "unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals," the protections could
lie, but noted that such would more likely be the case with the presentation of
documentary evidence and the calling of witnesses than with confrontation and
cross-examination.
38 See id. at 567. The court seemed particularly concerned about confrontation
and cross-examination: "If confrontation and cross-examination of those
furnishing evidence against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of
course, as in criminal trials, there would be considerable potential for havoc
inside the prison walls. Proceedings would inevitably be longer and tend to
unnanageability."
19 Id. at 569.
o See id. at 565.
41 See id.
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of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action
of government." '42
Wo/ffremains good law. The Court, however, narrowed the
scope of cases in which a Wo/ff liberty interest could exist in its 1995
decision in Sandin v. Conner.43 The Court explained:
Under Wolff, States may under certain circumstances
create liberty interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause. But these interests will be generally
limited to freedom from restraint which, while not
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner
as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause
of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.'
Although the scope of cases to which Wolff applies has
narrowed, the law of Woffremains unaltered as to those cases. Like
any law, however, it is susceptible to subversion. Indeed, because
Wo/ffprotects prisoners-an ostracized and alienated segment of our
population with limited access to the courts, minimal political clout,
and few resources-it is particularly susceptible to subversion. Prison
authorities are unlikely to succeed with blatant due process violations,
which are easily discerned and exposed by the various prison rights
watchdog groups. Subtle due process violations, however, obscured
by internal procedures and the appearance of propriety, are less likely
to be uncovered. These are the truly dangerous violations. These are
the violations which can be chilled with the effective assertion of
third party standing.
42 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
43 515 U.S. 472,483-84 (1995).
" Id. (citations omitted).
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III. THE LAW OF THIRD PARTY STANDING
In general, a party may not bring an action based on a third
party's constitutional rights.45 This rule is not constitutionally
mandated, but is instead a "prudential limitation on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction." '46 To fully understand the third party standing
doctrine, we must understand its history.
In Singleton v. Wulff, decided in 1976, the Supreme Court set
forth the two reasons justifying the rule's existence.47 First, the courts
should avoid adjudicating rights without cause.48 Since the possessor
of a right may not wish to assert it, adjudicating the right when
brought by a non-possessor may result in unnecessary adjudication.49
Second, the possessor of the right is generally the most effective
advocate of the right, and because the adversarial system relies on
parties to advocate effectively it follows that the most effective
advocate of a right should be left with the duty of asserting the right.50
Where these justifications are absent, however, the Court has
determined that the rule against third party standing need not apply.5
Thus, exceptions to the rule exist.
In Singleton, the Court considered several elements in
determining whether third party standing was appropriate. That case
involved a Missouri statute that limited funding for abortions.52
Missouri was a participant in the Medicaid program, and as such, was
entitled to federal funds for use in providing medical assistance to the
state's under-resourced population as long as the federal government
approved its plan for serving that population. The Missouri statute
"' See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961).
46 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.420, 445 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976).
48 See id.
49 See id.
" See id. at 114.
51 See id.
52 Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 208.151-208.158 (1975).
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containing the plan set forth twelve categories of services eligible for
Medicaid support. One of the twelve was "[f]amily planning services
as defined by federal rules and regulations; provided, however, that
such family planning services shall not include abortions unless such
abortions are certified in writing by a physician."" Two Missouri
physicians, both of whom had performed and anticipated performing
abortions, sued for a declaration that the statute was invalid and for an
injunction against enforcement of the statute.54 The federal district
court hearing the case dismissed the physicians' complaint for lack of
standing." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
squarely address the third party standing issue.56 The Court
approached third party standing in a more structured manner than it
had in the past, crafting a three-step analysis to examine the
physicians' claim for standing. The Court ultimately determined that
the physicians did have third party standing." Their determination,
however, was far less important than the process that led them to it.
That process is the backbone of today's third party standing analysis.
First, the Court sought to determine whether the plaintiff suffered
an "injury in fact" such that the proceeding would qualify as a "case
or controversy," giving federal courts jurisdiction over the matter
under Article 111.58 This requirement is, of course, not unique to third
party standing analysis. It serves as a basic constitutional barrier to
adjudication when no truly adverse relationship exists, and it is firmly
rooted.59 Indeed, "[n]o principle is more fundamental to the
judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
Id § 208.152.
See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 109.
5 See id at 110.
See id. at 111-12,
" See id. at 108.
'8 Id at 112.
59 See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
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controversies."' The inquiry is strait-forward. Article III requires that
"the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision."'" If the plaintiff is unable to make
such a showing, federal court adjudication would be gratuitous, and it
is thus prohibited.62
Once the Singleton Court was satisfied that the plaintiff
sustained actual injury, it moved to the next step of the analysis-
whether a party who has sustained an actual injury should be able to
base his or her claim or defense on a third person's rights.63 No
constitutional doctrine controls this portion of the analysis, and as
such, the Court was left to determine whether "as a prudential matter"
the plaintiff was an appropriate proponent of the asserted right.'
Unhampered by any constitutional standard, the courts are
bound only by judicial discretion in erecting barriers to third party
standing.65 Perhaps for this reason, third party standing doctrine is
fluid and has at times been unclear. Attempting to clarify the law, the
Singleton Court announced that "the Court has looked primarily to
two factual elements to determine whether the rule should apply in a
particular case" and then explained the importance of the two
elements in disposing of the case.66
The first element is the relationship between the possessor of
the right and the litigant.67 The court reasoned that if the relationship
is such that the possessor's "enjoyment of the right is inextricably
bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue," the court
can be confident that attention to the controversy will result in the
possessor's increased enjoyment of the right and that the litigant has
60 Id. at 37.
61 Id. at 38.
62 See id.
63 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117.
64 ld. at 112.
65 See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277,278
(1984).
6 Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
67 See id.
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appropriate incentives to advocate effectively.6" Such a relationship's
existence ensures that incentives are properly aligned and that the
litigant will be a strong advocate, but does not address a court's
concern about unnecessary adjudication in the event that the
possessor has no interest in raising the issue. Thus, the Court set out a
second element-the possessor's ability, or lack thereof, to assert the
right.69 If, in fact, the possessor is unable to assert the right, the
possessor's inaction ceases to imply disinterest, and instead suggests
powerlessness.7 Where there is an injury in fact and both of these
elements exist, the justifications for the general prohibition against
third party standing are hollow, and the exception to the rule lies.
In the 1991 case of Powers v. Ohio,7 the Court crafted the
Singleton elements into the modem test for third party standing. The
Court articulated a three-pronged test-each prong being a
precondition to third party standing.7" In that case, Powers, a white
man on trial for murder, sought to assert the equal protection rights of
seven black potential jurors who were excluded from the jury as a
result of the state's peremptory challenges." The Supreme Court
ultimately found Powers was entitled to third party standing.74
The Powers Court, however, took curious liberties with
Singleton in announcing the line of analysis it would follow, making
third party standing more difficult to attain. The Court began its
examination by asserting that a party can obtain third party standing
"provided three important criteria are satisfied."" Relying on
Singleton, the Powers court stated that to obtain third party standing a
"litigant must have suffered an 'injury in fact,' thus giving him or her
68 Id. atl14-15.
69 See id. at 115-16.
70 See id. at 116.
71 499 U.S. 400(1991).
71 See id. at 410-11.
73 See id. at 403.
74 See id. at 415.
71 Id. at410-11.
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a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in
dispute, the litigant must have a close relation to the third party, and
there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect
his or her own interests."76 The Powers Court did not alter the
analysis to be used in applying any of the particular elements."
However, it established that the close relationship and hindrance
elements were necessary to any finding of third party standing-
something the Singleton court seemingly did not do.
The Eleventh Circuit commented on the Powers Court's
peculiar restatement of Singleton in disposing of a 1994 case
involving a claim for third party standing." The Eleventh Circuit
panel noted that although the Powers Court referred to the Singleton
factors as criteria necessary to a finding of third party standing,
Singleton did not go so far.79 Referring to the three Singleton factors,
the panel asserted,"[a]lthough the Powers Court characterized these
factors as 'criteria' that must be met in order to justify third party
standing, the Court has not always been so clear.., as to how the
factors should be applied and whether or not all of the factors must be
met in order to justify third party standing.""0
The language of Singleton provides further evidence that the
Singleton Court did not intend to establish that a plaintiff need meet
all three of its elements to obtain third party standing. Although the
Singleton Court demanded the plaintiff suffer a concrete injury in
order to obtain third party standing, it did not insist that the close
relationship and hindrance elements be considered under third party
76 Id. at 411. (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976)) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
77 Interestingly, the Powers Court used the word hindrance to describe what the
Singleton Court called a genuine obstacle. There is no evidence in either case,
or in the cases that followed, to suggest that "hindrance" has any legal
significance that "genuine obstacle" does not. The terms are used
interchangeably.
78 Harrisv. Evans, 20F.3d.1118, 1122(llthCir. 1994).
79 See id. at 1122.
so Id.
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standing analysis. By referring to those two elements not as prongs of
a test, but simply as elements, and by looking to them "primarily"'"
instead of exclusively, the Court did not create a concrete test for use
in determining issues of third party standing.82 Interestingly, the
Powers Court made no pretense of interpreting, amending, or
overruling Singleton. It apparently endeavored merely to restate
Singleton, and seemed to do so incorrectly. The consequences of the
Powers Court's restatement of Singleton are obvious. The Powers test
significantly limits the circumstances under which a litigant may
obtain third party standing by demanding the litigant meet each of
three criteria to do so.
Correct interpretation or not, the Powers three-pronged test
drives today's third party standing analysis. Although the application
and meaning of the injury in fact prong is clear, the meanings of the
close relationship and hindrance prongs are not. As such, I explore
the meanings of each of these two prongs as they have developed
over the years. As noted above, the close relationship and hindrance
prongs are not constitutional requirements. They are court-created
barriers to litigation, which were first clearly articulated in Singleton
and were molded into a concrete test in Powers. Because Powers
relies flatly upon each Singleton prong (if not upon the relationship
among the prongs) in establishing the contemporary test for third
party standing, we must analyze Singleton, and as such, the cases
upon which Singleton relies, as well as Powers and its progeny, in
' Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976).
82 The confusion created by the Court's decision in Powers is further evidenced
in Professor Erwin Chemerinsky's Federal Jurisdiction, one of the academy's
foremost authorities on the complexities in federal jurisdictional law. In
explaining the exceptions to the general prohibition on third party standing,
Professor Chemerinsky asserts Singleton's close relationship and hindrance
factors as two entirely separate and independent exceptions. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3.4 (2d ed. 1994). This view is directly
at odds with Powers, perhaps indicating Professor Chemerinsky's disapproval
of the Court's alteration of Singleton in Powers.
2001-2002
BUFFALO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL
order to understand the application of the close relationship and
hindrance prongs.
A. The Close Relationship Prong
The "close relationship" necessary to clear this prong is not
what it would seem. As noted above, the Court views the existence of
a close relationship as a proxy for assurance that the litigant will
advocate effectively and that settling the controversy will increase the
possessor's enjoyment of the right.83 Thus, "close" in this context is
not synonymous with loving or affectionate. A close relationship
under the test is one in which the litigant's interests are linked to
those of the possessor; one in which the improvement of one's
condition is bound up with the improvement of the other's. The cases
bear this out.
The predecessors to Singleton-the three cases Singleton cites
as displaying an appropriately close relationship between litigant and
possessor-provide a range of relationships deemed acceptable under
the prong. None involve a traditionally affectionate relationship, but
all involve linkage between litigant and possessor.
Barrows v. Jackson,84 a case decided in 1953, involved a
restrictive covenant binding all owners of real estate in a particular
Los Angeles, California neighborhood. 5 The covenant prohibited any
owner from selling property to a non-white person. 6 One of the
parties to the covenant sold to a non-white, and other parties to the
covenant sued for breach.87 The respondent (the defendant at trial)
defended on the grounds that the covenant violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and that to render ajudgment
against her for breaching the covenant would amount to
" Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
85 See id. at 251.
8 See id.
87 See id.
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unconstitutional state action."8 The court began its discussion of
standing by noting that "[o]rdinarily, one may not claim standing in
this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.
8 9
The Court, however, ultimately determined standing was appropriate,
noting, among other things, that the relationship between the litigant
and the possessor was such that the litigant was as effective a
proponent as the possessor.90
In Griswold v. Connecticut,9' the relationship at issue existed
between the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and the medical director of the League's New Haven
Center (a licensed physician) on the one hand, and married people
seeking their advice on issues of contraception on the other.92 A
Connecticut statute in effect at the time outlawed the use of any drug
or instrument to prevent conception. 3 Another statute prohibited any
person from assisting any other person in committing an illegal
offense.94 In a particular instance, the directors prescribed a
contraceptive device to a married woman seeking to prevent
conception.95 The directors were prosecuted as accessories, found
guilty, and fined $100 each.96 They sought to defend by raising the
constitutional rights of the married people whom they counseled.97
The Supreme Court accepted their argument and held that the
directors had standing to raise their counselees' constitutional privacy
8 See id. at 254-55.
89 Id. at 255.
90 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. at 259. Indeed, the Court asserted that
"[respondent] is the one in whose charge and keeping reposes the power to
continue to use her property to discriminate or to discontinue such use." Id.
91 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 See id. at 480.
93 See id.
9 See id.
9" See id.
9 See id.
9' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 480.
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rights.9 Citing Barrows, among other cases, the Court stressed the
intertwined nature of the litigants' interests and the possessors' rights,
noting that the privacy rights of husband and wife "are likely to be
diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in" the
directors' suit.99
Eisenstadt v. Baird,"°° decided seven years after Griswold,
involved similar facts and resulted in the same conclusion. In that
case, the defendant at trial, William Baird, displayed contraceptive
articles during a lecture at Boston University and at the end of the
lecture gave an attendee a package of vaginal foam."0 ' He was
convicted under a statue prohibiting any person other than a physician
or a pharmacist from dispensing contraceptives.0 2 Baird appealed and
eventually reached the United States Supreme Court. As an initial
matter, the Court determined Baird did have standing to challenge the
statute as being unconstitutional.0 3 If Griswold left any impression
that the affection between counselor and counselee was important to
the Court's finding that the relationship survived the test, Eisenstadt
disabused us of it. The Eisenstadt Court granted Baird standing to
raise the possessor's constitutional rights although he had no
relationship with the possessor. Again, the Court stressed the
importance of the relationship between the advocacy and the right,
not the relationship between the individuals as individuals.0 4 Citing
Griswold, the Court reemphasized that the possessor's rights would
be adversely effected if Baird was unable to raise them, and noted
that Baird's advocacy would be a good proxy for the possessor's.0 5
On these grounds, the court granted standing.
9' See id. at481.
" See id.
'00 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
'0' See id. at 440.
102 See id. at 440-41.
103 See id. at 444.
,o' See id. at 445.
o See id. at 445-46.
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Analysis of these cases reveals the relationship that the
Singleton Court demanded in applying the close relationship prong is
the relationship between the litigant's advocacy and the possessor's
right, not between the litigant and the possessor.
Powers reaffirmed the Singleton Court's vision of the nature
of an appropriately close relationship for purposes of third party
standing analysis." 6 The Powers Court found that the litigant (the
criminal defendant) and the possessor (the excluded juror) had a
sufficiently close relationship under third party standing analysis. 7
Though the Court noted the possibility that the voir dire
process allows for the criminal defendant to develop a relationship
and even some semblance of trust with jurors, it focused, on the
relationship between the litigant's advocacy and the possessor's
right.0 8 "[The] congruence of interests makes it necessary and
appropriate for the defendant to raise the rights of the juror. And,
there can be no doubt that [the defendant] will be a motivated,
effective advocate for the excluded venirepersons' rights.' 0 9
B. The Hindrance Prong
If, indeed, a possessor has the realistic option of asserting a
right and chooses not to do so, any argument for third party standing
as to the adjudication of that right dissolves. Any rule subjecting an
unwilling possessor to the assertion of his own rights flies in the face
of the Court's aversion to unnecessary constitutional adjudication."o
As such, the hindrance prong ensures that third party standing be
granted when a possessor is unable to assert his rights, but not when a
possessor is simply unwilling to do so."' Just as it did with the "close
relationship" issue, the Singleton Court relied on three cases in setting
out what qualifies as a genuine hindrance in third party standing
' See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413-14 (1991).
' See id.
1D8 See id.
'09 See id. at 414.
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analysis. In essence, the cases establish that a hindrance exists if it
would be difficult-not necessarily impossible-for a possessor to
assert his right. Absolute impossibility is not required.
As with its discussion of the "close relationship" requirement,
in explaining the meaning of a genuine obstacle or hindrance, the
Singleton Court turned to Eisenstadt and Barrows for support.
The Eisenstadt Court faced a situation in which the possessors
had no convenient avenue to assert their rights themselves. The
statute under which Baird was convicted prevented certain persons
from dispensing contraceptives but contained no provision penalizing
the recipients of contraceptives-the parties whose privacy rights
were infringed by the statute."2 The Court noted the recipients
"[were] not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent,
[were] denied a forum in which to assert their rights."'" As such, the
Court found that the possessors in Eisenstadt faced a hindrance to
their assertion of their rights."4
The Barrows Court found the same--that the possessors
would likely not be able to effectively assert their rights.' In
Barrows, the possessors were obviously not parties to the
discriminatory covenant, and the Court determined that at the time
their chances of successfully suing on the basis of the covenantor's
refusal to sell to them were slim." 6 Thus, the court found an
appropriate hindrance existed.
The Singleton Court also relied on NAACP v. Alabama"7 in
fleshing out the meaning of a hindrance. In that case, the State of
Alabama sought to compel the National Association for the Advance-
I"o See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,459 (1958); Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
.. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976).
".. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-42, 446 (1972).
". See id. at 446.
114 See id.
'15 See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953).
116 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 125. (Powell, J., concurring).
" 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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ment of Colored People ("NAACP") to disclose the names on its
membership lists."8 The Court noted that "freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech"." 9 The
Court then found that compelled disclosure of the lists could curtail
that constitutional freedom by destroying anonymity, and thus
violating each member's constitutional rights.' Finding as such, the
Court was forced to address the NAACP's argument that it should be
granted standing to assert the constitutional rights of its members.
The Court determined resolutely that it should,' basing its decision
on the reality that the rights would otherwise go unprotected.' "To
require that [the right] be claimed by the members themselves," the
Court wrote, "would result in nullification of the right at the very
moment of its assertion."'' In other words, if the members were
forced to stand and assert their own rights, they would be under-
mining their goal-the preservation of their anonymity.
Crucial to the Singleton Court's analysis was its explicit
declaration that absolute impossibility was not necessary for a finding
of sufficient hindrance. The Court stressed that in each of the three
cases upon which it relied-Barrows, Eisenstadt, and NAACP-the
possessor's assertion of the right was difficult but not impossible.'24
In response to Justice Powell's dissent in Singleton in which
he argued that unlike Singleton, the three cases relied upon by the
Singleton majority "allow assertion of third party rights only when
such assertion by the third parties themselves would be 'in all
practicable terms impossible'," Justice Blackmun, writing for the
"' See id. at 453.
"9 Id. at 460.
See id. at 460-61.
i21 See id. at 466.
2 See id. at 459.
..3 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 459.
124 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 n.6. (1976).
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majority, insisted that "[c]arefully analyzed, [the] cases do not go that
far."' 25 Justice Blackmun then proceeded to examine the facts of each
case in proving his point:
The Negro real-estate purchaser in Barrows, if he
could prove that the racial covenant alone stood in the
way of his purchase (as presumably he could easily
have done, given the amicable posture of the seller in
that case), could surely have sought a declaration of
its invalidity or an injunction against its enforcement.
The Association members in NAACP v. Alabama
could have obtained a similar declaration or
injunction, suing anonymously by the use of pseudo-
nyms. The recipients of contraceptives in Eisenstadt...
could have sought similar relief as necessary to the
enjoyment of their constitutional rights.'26
The Court noted that these alternatives were not easy, and that indeed,
some were extremely difficult. 2 7 Still, the Court insisted they were
possible.'28 The Court refused to set the bar at impossibility, and for
good reason-the hindrance prong merely exists to ensure the
possessor's inaction is not born of disinterest.'29 The Court deter-
mined that a finding of absolute impossibility was unnecessary to
achieving that purpose, and thus concluded some degree of difficulty
was enough.
If any life remained in the debate between Justices Blackmun
and Powell as to the proper application of the hindrance prong,
Powers snuffed it out. In addressing the hindrance prong, the Powers
Court determined that the possessors (individual jurors who suffered
125 Id.
126 Id.
12 See id.
129 See id.
229 Seeid. at ll6.
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racial exclusion) faced sufficient obstacles in asserting their rights
such that the litigant satisfied the hindrance prong in his attempt to
obtain third party standing. 30 In explaining its determination, the
court left no room for guess work regarding whether assertion of
rights need be impossible or merely difficult: "We have held that
individual jurors subjected to racial exclusion have the legal right to
bring suit on their own behalf. As a practical matter, however, these
challenges are rare."'' The Court's meaning is plain. The jurors can
sue if they want, but they are unlikely to do so. "The reality is that a
juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom
possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed
to vindicate his own rights."' 32 In deciding that the jurors in question
confronted sufficient hindrances in asserting their rights, the Powers
Court firmly established that when a possessor can legally assert a
right, but is extremely unlikely to do so, the hindrance prong is
satisfied.
C. Third Party Standing in the Aftermath of Powers v. Ohio
The test for third party standing, as Powers established it,
reigns today. Of course, there has been some dissension. A minority
of the Supreme Court has attacked the Powers test as granting third
party standing too broadly. It did so most notably in JE.B. v.
Alabama,3 ' a 1994 case in which the Court found third party standing
to be appropriate. In that case, the State of Alabama, on behalf of the
mother of a minor child, brought an action for paternity and child
support against the child's father. 34 At trial, the state used all but one
of its peremptory strikes to eliminate male jurors.'35 The defendant, in
3 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1991).
I3 d. at 414.
I3 d. at 415.
113 511U.S. 127 (1994).
14 See id. at 129.
15 See id.
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turn, used all but one of his peremptory strikes to eliminate female
jurors.'36 Because the panel of potential jurors included many more
females than males, the resultant jury was entirely female., 7 At the
close of trial, the jury found against the defendant and ordered that he
pay child support.'
The defendant appealed on the grounds that the state's
peremptory challenges based solely on gender violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 The case even-
tually reached the Supreme Court. Noting that intentional gender
discrimination by the state or by an agent thereof violates the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court found for the petitioner (the defendant
below). 4 Because the petitioner was asserting the rights of male
jurors instead of his own rights, he obviously relied on third party
standing. Interestingly, the Court did not directly address the standing
issue in its opinion, perhaps secure in what it considered to be the
obviousness of third party standing's applicability in this case.
Writing in dissent, and joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Thomas, Justice Scalia maligned the court for according the petitioner
standing. 4 Justice Scalia took issue with the Court's determination
that the state's peremptory challenges were unconstitutional, but
argued that if anybody had a viable cause of action, it was one of the
eliminated jurors. 42 "[T]he only arguable injury from the prosecutor's
"impermissible" use of male sex as the basis for his peremptories is
injury to the stricken juror, not to the defendant."' 43 Justice Scalia
seemed disturbed that the Court was not explicit in its grant of
standing, and indicated that Powers was at its root." "The Court
t36 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 130.
140 See id. at 130-31.
141 See id. at 158-59. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 158.
143 Id.
244 See id. at 158-59.
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today presumably supplies petitioner with a cause of action by
applying the uniquely expansive third party standing analysis of
Powers v. Ohio, according petitioner a remedy because of the wrong
done to male jurors."'' 45
Justice Scalia explained neither why he believed that the
Powers analysis is unique, nor the ways in which he would reduce its
expanse. He merely referred to third party standing in this instance as
"making restitution to Paul when it is Peter who has been robbed"
and condemned it as being a bad idea.'46 Justice Scalia then moved on
to the heart of his dissent-his argument that the peremptory
challenges made at trial were not unconstitutional. 147
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider third
party standing again in 1998 when it heard Campbell v. Louisiana,141
and again it adhered to the Powers analysis-this time with a solid 7-
2 majority. Campbell is in many ways similar to Powers. Terry
Campbell, a White man convicted of second-degree murder, appealed
his conviction on the ground that the grand jurors who indicted him
were selected in a discriminatory manner. 49 Relying on Powers, he
argued that he had standing to assert the rights of the excluded Black
jurors.'50 Applying the Powers test, the Supreme Court found that
Campbell met all three prongs of the test, and that he was thus
entitled to standing.' The Court could "find no reason why a white
defendant would be any less effective an advocate for excluded grand
jurors than for excluded petit jurors," and thus followed the logic of
Powers in reaching its decision.'52
141 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 158-59 (citations omitted).
'4 Id. at 159.
147 See id.
141 523 U.S. 392 (1998).
'1 See id. at 395.
"SO See id. at 397.
"I' See id. at 400.
152 Id.
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With Justice Rehnquist having defected to the majority on the
standing issue, Justices Scalia and Thomas stood alone in their
opposition to the Court's analysis. Justice Thomas, writing for the
two, argued strenuously that Powers was wrongly decided.
5 3
Asserting that "Powers distorted standing principles.., and should
be overruled,"'54 he pushed for a more narrow application of third
party standing. 5' Representing two of nine justices, however,
Thomas' argument had no impact on the controlling law.
The Court wrestled with the requirements for third party
standing yet again in Miller v. Albright, 56 and again the justices
decided to grant third party standing by a comfortable margin. That
case involved a woman, Lorelyn Miller ("Lorelyn"), bom out of
wedlock to a Filipino woman and an American man.'57 Lorelyn, who
was born in the Philippines, applied to the State Department in 1992
for registration as an American citizen, and was denied.'58 Shortly
thereafter, Charlie Miller ("Charlie"), her father, sought a paternity
decree establishing Lorelyn as his daughter.'5 9 A Texas court granted
the paternity decree and Lorelyn reapplied for citizenship. 6 ' She was
again denied, this time because the State Department determined that
the paternity decree failed to satisfy a federal statute-8 U.S.C. §
1409-requiring that a child born outside of the United States and out
of wedlock to an American mother and a non-American father be
legitimated before the child reaches eighteen years of age if the child
is to acquire American citizenship.' Lorelyn turned eighteen in
' See id. at 403-09. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
4 Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. at 404.
' See id. at 403-08.
- 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
117 See id. at 424-25.
"' See id. at 426.
19 See id.
16 See id.
161 See id.
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1988, and was thus well passed eighteen when she applied for
citizenship. 6
Both Lorelyn and Charlie sued the Secretary of State in
federal court seeking American citizenship for Lorelyn.,63 They noted
that children born in other countries to an American mother and a
non-American father were granted American citizenship at birth and
argued that, as such, the statute's disparate treatment of citizen
mothers and citizen fathers violated Charlie's Fifth Amendment equal
protection rights."6 At the district court level, the government moved
to dismiss Charlie's complaint on the ground that if any person's
rights were offended they were Lorelyn's, not Charlie's.'65 In
actuality, it was established later in the process of litigation that
Charlie's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights were indeed the
implicated rights.'66 The district court, however, accepted the
government's argument, and dismissed Charlie's claim for lack of
standing.'67 As to Lorelyn's claim, the court held that although she
suffered injury, federal courts are not authorized to grant citizenship,
and as such her injury could not be redressed. 6 Charlie did not press
his claim on appeal, but Lorelyn did.
When Lorelyn's case reached the Supreme Court, the Court
was forced to address whether she had standing to assert Charlie's
equal protection right. The opinion as a whole was fragmented, with
five different justices writing. On the issue of third party standing,
however, only two justices argued against granting standing. No
justice disputed that Lorelyn established she had suffered an injury in
fact or that her advocacy and her father's right were appropriately co-
dependant. The only debate on the standing issue regarded the
162 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 425.
163 See id. at 426.
164 See id.
161 See id. at 426-27, 448.
'16 See id. at 448.
167 See id. at 426-27.
168 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 427.
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hindrance prong. Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justice
Rehnquist in announcing the judgment of the Court, focused his
opinion on the alleged constitutionality of§ 1409, giving the standing
issue scant attention. Regarding standing, he noted simply that the
Court "agree[s] with the Court of Appeals that [Lorelyn] has standing
to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts."'69
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg,
dissented as to the Court's judgment regarding the constitutionality of
§ 1409, but agreed with Justice Stevens on the standing issue.
Perhaps dissatisfied with Justice Stevens' cursory treatment, Justice
Breyer dedicated a significant portion of his opinion to explaining
why Lorelyn was entitled to standing. He argued forcefully that the
government hindered Charlie from pursuing his claim. 7' Specifically,
he argued that the government's motion to dismiss Charlie's
complaint on the ground that his rights were not implicated, the
district court's consequent dismissal, and a subsequent change of
venue effectively prevented the assertion of his rights.'7' Justice
Breyer acknowledged that Charlie was not entirely barred from
asserting his rights.'72 He wrote, however, that "[a]ppeals take time
and money; the transfer of venue left the plaintiffs uncertain about
where to appeal; the case was being heard with Lorelyn as plaintiff in
any event; and the resulting comparison of costs (viewed
prospectively) likely would have discouraged Charlie's pursuit of the
alternative appeal route."' 73
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
Court's judgment and agreed with the Court's decision to grant
standing. 74 He established, though, that he did not agree with Justice
'69 d at 433.
370 See id. at 474. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171 See id.
372 See id.
173 Id.
" Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 452, 455 n.1. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Breyer's dissent as it regarded standing,'75 perhaps for fear that
Justice Breyer sought to open the courthouse door too widely. Justice
Scalia simply wrote-without explanation-that if it were his
decision to make he would have granted Lorelyn standing to assert
Charlie's rights.176
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy, represented by Justice
O'Connor's opinion, stood alone in their opposition to the Court's
grant of standing. Justice O'Connor argued that Lorelyn did not have
standing to assert her father's rights because her father was not
sufficiently hindered in asserting his own rights.'77 She noted that
Charlie's only hindrance was his setback at the trial court level, and
that nothing prevented him from appealing the district court
decision.' Justice O'Connor seemed to fear the birth of a phenome-
non in which a litigant loses at trial and considers such a loss a
hindrance for standing analysis purposes, chooses not to appeal, and
then passes the proverbial baton to a second litigant who satisfies the
injury in fact and close relationship prongs and is perhaps better
equipped to pursue the litigation. Indeed, she asserted that a conclu-
sion that Charlie was sufficiently hindered "would be a step toward
eliminating the hindrance prong altogether."'79 The other seven
Justices, however, obviously disagreed with Justice O'Connor's
perspective, leaving the Powers three-pronged test intact.
Although the Powers test carries the day,' the precise
parameters of each prong is not exceedingly well-defined. Indeed,
referring to the requirements for third party standing, Justice Scalia
has gone so far as to assert that "[the Court's] law on [the] subject is
in need of what may charitably be called clarification....",80 While
Justice Scalia may be stating the case a bit strongly, the contours of
71 See id. at455n.1.
,76 See id.
" See id. at 448. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178 See id.
179 Id. at 449.
,so Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 455 n. 1. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the doctrine are admittedly not entirely clear. At a minimum, though,
the Court's jurisprudence as developed in cases spanning half-a-
century-from the predecessors to Singleton through Powers and its
progeny-has taught us this: In order for a litigant to acquire third
party standing, (1) the litigant must have suffered some injury due to
the impingement of the possessor's right, (2) the relationship between
the litigant's advocacy and the possessor's right must be such that the
litigant has an appropriate incentive to advocate effectively and that
the litigant's advocacy, if successful, will lead to the possessor's
greater enjoyment of his right, and (3) the possessor must face some
hindrance (though it need not be insurmountable) to the assertion of
his own rights. With this understanding of the prevailing law, we
launch an analysis of Perry's case.
IV. PERRY'S CASE
Everett Perry worked for the MDOC for five years. 8' During
that time he served as a disciplinary hearing officer in the MDOC's
office of Policy and Hearings.' The MDOC's inmate disciplinary
process is not unlike the processes utilized in other state prison
systems. When an inmate is charged with a violation of prison rules,
he or she appears at a disciplinary hearing at which an adjudicator
determines the guilt or innocence of the charged party.8 3 Perry was
one such adjudicator. Specifically, the state entrusted him with
hearing, and disposing of, major misconduct cases within the
prison." 4 Perry's tenure with the MDOC began auspiciously. The
MDOC evaluates each of its new hearing officers after three months
and then again after six months; Perry received satisfactory
evaluations on both occasions.'85 Indeed, during his first eighteen
'8' See Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2000).
182 See id.
183 See Mich. Comp Laws § 791.251(2)(a)(1999).
114 See Perry, 209 F.3d at 600.
"' See id. at 605.
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months as a hearing officer, Perry received strong reviews." 6 In
March of 1990, Perry's supervisor cited Perry for the unsatisfactory
disposition of a case. 87 It was Perry's first negative citation.'88 Forty-
three months and twenty-three citations later, Perry was fired.8 9
Following his termination, Perry alleged that his citations for
unsatisfactory disposition of cases were pretextual. 90 He maintained
that he was cited and eventually terminated in retaliation for his
insistence on impartiality during his hearing and disposition of
disciplinary cases.'
Substantial evidence supports his contention. The twenty-
three citations in forty-three months were not what they would seem.
In fact, during the first twenty-seven of those forty-three months,
Perry was only cited four times.' During the remaining sixteen
months, he was cited nineteen times. '93 Perry argued that the dramatic
increase in citations was not coincidental. He noted that on June 18,
1992-twenty-seven months into his employment-his supervisor
wrote a memorandum to the Administrator of the MDOC's Office of
Policy and Hearings in response to the Administrator's request for a
review of Perry's decisions favoring inmates.'94 The memorandum
concluded that Perry too frequently issued dismissals and not-guilty
findings. '95 After production of the memorandum, the frequency with
which Perry was cited substantially increased.'96 As noted above, he
received nineteen citations over his final sixteen months on the job.
Perry insisted the increase in citations was a direct result of the
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id.
290 Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d at 605.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id.
195 See id.
"9 Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d at 605.
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memorandum. He provided extensive evidence that the MDOC
demanded its hearing officers limit not-guilty findings and dismissals
to ten percent of the cases before them and acknowledged that he
disregarded the ten percent goal.'97 He insisted that he considered the
facts before him and disposed of cases impartially without concern
for any particular guilty verdict quota.'98 Ultimately, his disposition of
cases resulted in not-guilty findings and dismissals in approximately
eighteen percent of his cases-a rate well above the organizational
goal. 19
9
Perry's argument that the MDOC frequently cited and finally
terminated him because he did not abide by the ten percent standard
is strengthened by the nature of his citations. The MDOC cited Perry
for transgressions frequently committed by other hearing officers but
for which other hearing officers were not cited, and for other
seemingly trivial mistakes. 2' He was eventually fired on the strength
of the numerous citations.
V. PERRY'S POTENTIAL THIRD PARTY STANDING
CLAIM
Perry's third party due process claim would be simple. Perry
would argue that the state committed a due process violation by
placing a cap on the number of not-guilty determinations and
dismissals occurring during the scope of a prison's disciplinary
hearings. As noted above, not all prison discipline implicates an
inmate's due process rights secured under Wolff. In Sandin, the
Supreme Court seemingly limited the circumstances in which an
inmate's liberty interest is triggered to certain cases in which an
inmate is restrained.2 ' Presumably, not all of the cases brought before
'" See id. at 606.
198 See id.
'9 See id. at 605.
2 See id. at 602-3.
20 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).
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Perry involved such a potential punishment. Some, however, certainly
did. Under Michigan statute, the hearings division of which Perry was
a part is responsible for adjudicating cases involving "[a]n infraction
of a prison rule that may result in punitive segregation... ,,o 2 Since
the ten percent not-guilty standard was applied across the board-
including cases involving possible punishment of punitive segrega-
tion, and thus potentially triggering a liberty interest-the due process
rights of at least some of the inmates before Perry were implicated.
It goes without saying that a pre-determined guilty percentage
ensures the absence of case-by-case impartial adjudication, and
guarantees arbitrariness. As Judge Damon Keith wrote in discussing
the MDOC guilty verdict quota in Perry v. McGinnis, "[t]he prisoner
whose case merits a not-guilty finding, but whose case would result
in the eleventh not-guilty finding in one hundred decisions, is sunk.
His fate is sealed before his file is opened. Such a system reeks of
arbitrary justice, which can only be injustice."' 3 Because "[t]he
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government[,]""2 4 due process certainly suffers a
beating under this regime.
The due process right at stake, however, is the inmate's right.
The inmate is the individual faced with the possibility of a guilty
finding based not on the facts as applied to prison regulations, but on
the desire to increase the occurrence of guilty findings in a prison's
disciplinary hearings. The hearing officer, himself, suffers no
obstruction to his due process rights. He does, however, suffer
because of the violation. Because of the violation, and his refusal to
be complicit in the violation, he loses his job. Although he was fired
as the result of a due process violation, his due process rights were
not violated, and he is thus left without a due process claim. Third
party standing, however, provides an avenue for the claim.
.0 Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.251 (2)(a) (1999).
203 Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 606 (6th Cir. 2000).
204 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
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As explored above, in order to obtain third party standing: (1)
the litigant must have suffered some injury due to the impingement of
the possessor's right; (2) the relationship between the litigant's
advocacy and the possessor's right must be such that the litigant has
an appropriate incentive to advocate effectively and that the litigant's
advocacy, if successful, will lead to the possessor's greater enjoyment
of his right; and (3) the possessor must face some hindrance (but not
necessarily an insurmountable hindrance) to the assertion of his own
rights. An analysis of Perry's case illustrates that Perry and other
hearing officers in his position are excellent candidates for third party
standing.
A. Perry's Injury
It is axiomatic that to obtain standing to litigate in federal
court (whether it be standing to assert one's own rights or standing to
assert a third party's rights), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury
in fact."'5 Without a showing of injury, no Article III "case or
controversy" exists, and the federal court lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate the matter.2"6
In his suit, Perry, the plaintiff, asserted that he was terminated
from his employment as an MDOC hearing officer because he refused
to abide by a standard limiting his not-guilty and dismissal findings to
ten percent of his total dispositions.0 7 His alleged injury, therefore, is
his termination.
There can be no real argument as to the application of this
prong. Perry's termination resulted in an injury that was "real and
immediate," as is required for standing, not "conjectural" or
"hypothetical."2 8 As such, it is clear that Perry suffered an injury in
fact.
25 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
206 See id. at 101.
207 See Perry, 209 F.3d at 605.
208 City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 102.
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B. The Close Relationship
The next step of the analysis requires inquiry into the nature
of the relationship between Perry and the inmates before him. That
relationship is clearly one in which Perry's advocacy as a litigant in
federal court is thoroughly intertwined with the inmates' due process
rights. Perry has a tremendous incentive to advocate zealously and
effectively. Successful advocacy will gain him redress for his
wrongful termination; failure before the courts will gain him nothing.
In addition, there is little doubt that if Perry is successful, the inmates
before him will experience greater enjoyment of their due process
rights. If reinstated, Perry would presumably continue to resolve
cases as he has in the past-impartially and without concern for
finding ninety percent of the inmates before him guilty. Such
disposition of cases is fundamental to the notion of due process. 9
Furthermore, the positive ramifications of a ruling in favor of
Perry would almost assuredly reach beyond the inmates appearing
before Perry. Other MDOC hearing officers have noted that they felt
significant pressure to meet the ten percent standard, indicating that in
the absence of the standard they would decide some cases
differently. 0 In that the ten percent standard can only import
arbitrariness into a hearing officer's decision-making process, a
decision made without regard for the standard will be less arbitrary
than one made in light of the standard. Because arbitrary decision-
making has no place in the dispensation of due process, numerous
hearing officers' exclusion of the ten percent standard as a decision
making factor will certainly lead to inmates' greater enjoyment of
their due process rights. We see, then, that Perry and other hearing
officers in his position are properly incentivized to assert the due
process rights of inmates, and that if successful, the advocacy will
provide inmates greater enjoyment of their due process rights. As
20Q See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
"" See Perry, 209 F.3d at 601-02.
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such, it seems clear that Perry and inmates in the prison in which he
worked have the relationship necessary to survive the close relation-
ship prong.
The factual scenarios of both Powers and Campbell, cases in
which the Court found the relationship between litigant and possessor
sufficient to survive the close relationship prong, further support a
finding that the relationship between Perry and the inmates before
him should survive the prong.
As noted above, Powers and Campbell each involved jury
selection."' The finding of third party standing in both cases was
based on the relationship between the accused and the people charged
with appraising the accused's conduct. The Court, in both cases,
found that the interests of each was intertwined with the interests of
the other in such a way that third party standing was appropriate. Like
Powers and Campbell, Perry's case involves the relationship between
the accused and the person appraising the accused's conduct. Perry's
case, of course, involves a disciplinary hearing officer and a
defendant in a disciplinary hearing instead of a jury and a defendant
in a criminal trial, but the relationships are essentially the same-they
involve the trier and the person being tried.
All things considered, under the Powers test Perry clearly has
the necessary close relationship with the inmates appearing before
him. Perry has an appropriate incentive to advocate zealously, and his
advocacy, if successful, can only increase the inmates' enjoyment of
their due process rights. The similarities between Perry's case and the
facts of Powers and Campbell further support the conclusion that
Perry would survive the close relationship prong.
211 See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1998); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400,402 (1991).
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C. The Hindrance
Finally, we must examine whether a disciplinary hearing
defendant faces some hindrance to the assertion of his own rights. As
the Court noted in Singleton and Powers, a litigant need not show that
it would be absolutely impossible for the possessor of the right to
assert the right. The litigant need only show that the possessor would
be hindered, as a practical matter, in attempting to assert the right.
Under this standard, disciplinary hearing defendants are,
without doubt, sufficiently hindered. Again, reference to Powers and
Campbell is helpful. In establishing that the excluded jurors in
Powers were sufficiently hindered under third party standing analysis,
the Powers Court noted that "[the barriers to a suit by an excluded
juror are daunting." '212 The Court expounded:
Potential jurors are not parties to the jury selection
process and have no opportunity to be heard at the
time of their exclusion. Nor can excluded jurors easily
obtain declaratory or injunctive relief when discrimi-
nation occurs through an individual prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges... And, there exist
considerable practical barriers to suit by the excluded
juror because of the small financial stake involved and
the economic burdens of litigation.2"3
The hindrances faced by disciplinary hearing defendants in
cases like Perry's are surely more oppressive than these. First, the
economic cost of civil litigation for the disciplinary hearing
defendants is as burdensome, if not more burdensome, than the cost
of civil litigation for excluded jurors. More to the point, however, the
disciplinary hearing defendants are deprived of the information
212 Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
213 Id. at 414-15.
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necessary to assert their own rights. As noted, the MDOC guilty
verdict quota policy was an unwritten one. It consisted of an informal
understanding among prison officials. As such, disciplinary hearing
defendants could have had no access to documents addressing the
scheme. Further, because disciplinary hearing defendants are
negatively impacted by the policy, and because they would have
grounds to challenge the policy if they knew about it, it is unrealistic
to believe that prison officials would volunteer information about the
scheme in the absence of extraordinary compulsion.
Finally, the quota system employed in Perry's case is
unknown to both inmates and the community at large; it is a system
familiar only to prison officials. Prisons are, by their very nature,
restrictive, meaning that prisoners generally subsist within an
information vacuum. Acquiring any information not readily available
within prison walls, therefore, is obviously somewhat difficult. In the
case of the quota system, however, the information a prisoner needs
to assert his due process rights cannot be found outside of the prison
walls either. The prison officials instituting the system are the only
people who have access to information about the quota, and, as noted
above, they have an incentive to keep the information to themselves.
Consequently, "as a practical matter,"2 4 disciplinary hearing
defendants are hindered from asserting their due process rights under
the quota system. Indeed, the only class of people seemingly
unhindered in asserting the disciplinary hearing defendants' due
process rights are prison officials such as Perry.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prisoners are a vulnerable lot.215 They live apart from us in
closely regulated environments with neither the amenities nor the
214 Id. at 414.
25 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV.
543, 631-32 (2000) ("[T]he relative invisibility and low moral status of the
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protections of mainstream society. Some of this deprivation flows
directly from the very nature of incarceration. Indeed, "[1lawful
imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and
privileges of the ordinary citizen[.] 'J" 6 Lawful imprisonment does not,
however, entirely abrogate an inmate's due process rights. Policies
which limit the number of inmates who, in prison disciplinary
hearings, can be found not guilty of committing infractions that could
result in punitive segregation, unconstitutionally deprive inmates of
those due process rights.
Because inmates have no access to such policies, and thus no
knowledge of a constitutional violation and consequently no means to
challenge it, they rely entirely on prison hearing officers to protect
their due process rights. If agents of the state improperly prevent
hearing officers from protecting those rights through termination, the
inmates' due process rights are damaged.
Third party standing is appropriate for Perry and other hearing
officers is his position, because: (1) the terminated hearing officer
suffers injury in fact; (2) the relationship between the hearing
officer's advocacy and the inmate's right is such that the hearing
officer has an appropriate incentive to advocate effectively, and the
hearing officer's advocacy, if successful, will lead to the inmate's
greater enjoyment of his right; and (3) the inmate faces some
hindrance in asserting his own right. Indeed, the filing of third party
due process claims can serve as an effective method of protecting
hearing officers and inmates alike from intra-prison disciplinary
hearings perverted by unconstitutional guilty verdict quotas.
prison population makes prisoners especially vulnerable and heightens the
need for accountability.").
216 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
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